Aryan SinghandClaude Opus 5
c6a564ec5d
Every stage now runs client-side: pdf.js renders, a per-pixel diff finds the hidden ink, tesseract.js transcribes it on request, and pdf-lib rebuilds the flattened export. The PDF goes from the file picker into memory and back out as a download, and is never sent anywhere. That makes the privacy claim structural rather than a promise. The server is left with one route — a health check — so there is no code path that can receive a document, nothing is persisted, and no account exists. The OCR model and WASM are staged out of node_modules into public/ at build time so the page never reaches a CDN either. Verified in the browser: a full scan with OCR contacts exactly one origin, its own, and POST /api/upload returns 404 in the built image. Contrast stretching turned out to be the wrong method entirely. Text painted in pure #FFFFFF rasterizes to bytes identical to blank paper, so there is no difference in the image to amplify — and a page with black body text already spans 0-255, so the old server-side normalize() was a no-op. It could never have found the case it advertised. So each page is rendered twice, on white and on black. White ink vanishes into the first and blazes in the second; inverting the black-backed render and taking the darker pixel of each pair puts every mark on the page in view whatever colour it was drawn in. Confirmed against a PDF carrying a genuine white-on-white payload: invisible in "as delivered", flagged in vermilion in "revealed", and transcribed verbatim by OCR. Pages that paint their own opaque background defeat the technique, so that case is detected and reported as unreliable instead of showing a page-sized false positive. OCR is opt-in, as asked: it costs an ~8MB model download and runs at a few seconds a page, so nothing is fetched until the box is ticked. Consequences: - Removed auth, Prisma, Postgres, the upload/render/pixel/ocr/export routes, the storage layer and the signed-in dashboard. - Runtime dependencies drop from 13 to 6, all browser-capable; sharp, @napi-rs/canvas, next-auth, pg and the Prisma stack are all gone. - compose is a single stateless service with no volumes and no config, the entrypoint and its migration step are gone, and the image drops from 868MB to 455MB. - The landing page no longer describes the contrast method it used to claim, since that method provably does not work. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
44 lines
1.4 KiB
Docker
44 lines
1.4 KiB
Docker
# syntax=docker/dockerfile:1.7
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FROM node:20-bookworm-slim AS base
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WORKDIR /app
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ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
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FROM base AS deps
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COPY package.json package-lock.json* ./
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RUN npm ci
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FROM base AS builder
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COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
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COPY . .
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# `prebuild` stages the pdf.js worker and the Tesseract core/WASM out of
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# node_modules into public/, so the app serves them from its own origin
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# instead of a CDN. Nothing here needs env vars: the app has no database, no
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# auth and no server-side processing, so there is nothing to configure.
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RUN npm run build
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FROM node:20-bookworm-slim AS runner
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WORKDIR /app
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ENV NODE_ENV=production
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ENV NEXT_TELEMETRY_DISABLED=1
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ENV PORT=3000
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# Docker sets HOSTNAME to the container id, and Next's standalone server binds
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# to it verbatim — which makes the app unreachable on localhost inside the
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# container (breaking the healthcheck). Pin it to all interfaces.
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ENV HOSTNAME=0.0.0.0
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RUN groupadd --system --gid 1001 nodejs \
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&& useradd --system --uid 1001 --gid nodejs nextjs
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# Next standalone server + assets. public/ carries the OCR model and WASM, so
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# it is the bulk of the image.
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COPY --from=builder /app/public ./public
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COPY --from=builder /app/.next/standalone ./
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COPY --from=builder /app/.next/static ./.next/static
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USER nextjs
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EXPOSE 3000
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# No entrypoint script: there are no migrations to run and no volume to set up.
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CMD ["node", "server.js"]
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