aryansingh/muse
1
0 Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Actions Packages Projects Releases Wiki Activity

Add multi-user: Google OAuth, roles, quotas, admin panel

Browse Source 
Phase 2. The schema landed last commit; this makes it real.

AUTH is now multi-provider. MUSE_AUTH takes a comma list, so github,google
runs both. The callback URL is unchanged — /auth/callback for every provider,
with the provider carried in the state COOKIE rather than the query string —
so adding Google needs no edit to an already-registered GitHub app, and the
callback can't be steered to a different provider by the redirect. With more
than one enabled, /auth/login shows a chooser built from style attributes
only, which the CSP already permits, so it needs no stylesheet and no extra
hash.

Google identities are the VERIFIED email. An unverified one is refused: anyone
can put someone else's address on an account they control, and the allowlist is
keyed on exactly that string.

WHO MAY LOG IN is now two rules — the MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS bootstrap list, then
a non-disabled users row. Inviting is adding a row; no email, no token, no
expiry to manage. MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS stays mandatory only while the table is
empty, so a working multi-user install isn't held hostage by an env var it has
outgrown, but an empty database with no allowlist still refuses to start
because nobody could ever get in. The rule is one function used at login AND
on every request: checking only at sign-in isn't revocation, it's a delay.

QUOTAS are requests per calendar month and bytes of imported audio, 0 =
unlimited. Calendar month, not a rolling window — "12 left until the 1st" is
something a person can plan around. Batches are checked against the whole
batch, so a 30-track album with 5 requests left is refused up front rather
than accepted and abandoned halfway. Storage is measured from the file
actually written, not the size the peer advertised. Admins are exempt.

ADMIN PANEL: host CPU/memory/disk read straight from /proc — no psutil, no
compiled dependency, and in a container /proc reports the host, which is what
you want for a homelab box. Plus library totals, slskd connection state, a
30-day chart, per-user and per-artist breakdowns, and inline role/quota
editing. The chart is hand-rolled SVG: a charting library would add ~150KB for
one stacked bar chart and most of them inject <style> at runtime, which this
app's CSP blocks.

Guard rails: the last active admin cannot be demoted, disabled or deleted;
disabling revokes sessions immediately; deleting a user keeps their jobs,
because the history records what is in the library and why. Requests are
private by default — users see their own, admins see all — and retrying
someone else's job returns 404 rather than 403, since a distinct error would
confirm the id exists.

Also drops AnimatePresence mode="wait" from the tab container. It gates the
incoming panel on the outgoing one's exit animation reporting finished, so
anything that stalls the frame loop leaves the UI stuck on the old tab with no
way forward — found while testing, where a backgrounded page froze navigation
entirely. A cosmetic transition should never gate navigation.

Verified: admin endpoints 200/403/403/401 for admin/user/guest/anon; last-admin
demote, disable and delete all 409; disable revokes mid-session; quota refuses
the 3rd of 2 and a 30-track batch, then succeeds once raised; users see only
their own jobs; cross-user retry 404s; bad role/provider/duplicate/empty patch
all rejected; multi-provider chooser and both redirects correct; three CSRF
variants 400; preflight refuses unknown providers, missing secrets, and an
empty database with no allowlist. CPU, memory and disk confirmed populated
inside the linux/amd64 container.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Aryan SinghandClaude Opus 5 committed 2026-08-04 20:54:12 -05:00
1 parent 3b4b68daaf
commit f3c64d4fd0
8 files changed
+1642 -171
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

No files matched your search

app.py
+651 -89
View File
@@ -37,10 +37,12 @@ import uuid
from contextlib import asynccontextmanager
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
from pathlib import Path
from urllib.parse import urlencode
import httpx
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import FileResponse, JSONResponse, RedirectResponse
from fastapi.responses import (FileResponse, HTMLResponse, JSONResponse,
RedirectResponse)
from fastapi.staticfiles import StaticFiles
from pydantic import BaseModel
@@ -108,7 +110,7 @@ DERIVATIVE_RE = re.compile(r"\b(" + "|".join(DERIVATIVE) + r")\b")
# ─────────────────────────── auth ───────────────────────────
#
# Single-user GitHub OAuth, built so this can face the internet.
# OAuth against GitHub and/or Google, built so this can face the internet.
#
# FAILS CLOSED. Auth is on unless MUSE_AUTH is explicitly set to "off", and if
# it is on with incomplete config the app refuses to start. The failure mode
@@ -120,29 +122,65 @@ DERIVATIVE_RE = re.compile(r"\b(" + "|".join(DERIVATIVE) + r")\b")
# nothing else, and the database stores only its SHA-256. There is no signed
# payload to get wrong, a stolen database yields no usable cookies, and logout
# and revocation actually revoke.
#
# WHO MAY LOG IN is two rules, checked in this order:
# 1. MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS — the bootstrap allowlist. Always admitted. This is
# how the very first admin gets in when the users table is empty, and it
# is the recovery path if someone disables themselves.
# 2. A row in `users` that is not disabled — how everyone invited later gets
# in, without an env change or a redeploy.
# Anyone matching neither is rejected and the attempt is logged.
AUTH_MODE = os.getenv("MUSE_AUTH", "github").strip().lower()
GH_CLIENT_ID = os.getenv("MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID", "").strip()
GH_CLIENT_SECRET = os.getenv("MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET", "").strip()
ALLOWED_USERS = {u.strip().lower()
for u in os.getenv("MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS", "").split(",") if u.strip()}
ENABLED_PROVIDERS = [p for p in (x.strip() for x in AUTH_MODE.split(","))
if p and p != "off"]
# Absolute external URL, e.g. https://muse.aryan-singh.dev. Used to build the
# OAuth callback. Taken from config rather than from X-Forwarded-* headers on
# purpose: those are attacker-controllable and this is a redirect target.
BASE_URL = os.getenv("MUSE_BASE_URL", "").rstrip("/")
ALLOWED_USERS = {u.strip().lower()
for u in os.getenv("MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS", "").split(",") if u.strip()}
COOKIE_SECURE = os.getenv("MUSE_COOKIE_SECURE", "true").lower() != "false"
SESSION_DAYS = int(os.getenv("MUSE_SESSION_DAYS", "7"))
SESSION_COOKIE = "muse_session"
STATE_COOKIE = "muse_oauth_state"
GH_AUTH = "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize"
GH_TOKEN = "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token"
# One callback URL for every provider — the provider is carried in the state
# COOKIE, not the query string, so adding Google needs no change to the GitHub
# OAuth app that is already registered against /auth/callback.
PROVIDERS: dict[str, dict] = {
"github": {
"label": "GitHub",
"authorize": "https://github.com/login/oauth/authorize",
"token": "https://github.com/login/oauth/access_token",
"scope": "read:user",
"client_id": os.getenv("MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID", "").strip(),
"client_secret": os.getenv("MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET", "").strip(),
"id_env": "MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID",
"secret_env": "MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET",
},
"google": {
"label": "Google",
"authorize": "https://accounts.google.com/o/oauth2/v2/auth",
"token": "https://oauth2.googleapis.com/token",
"scope": "openid email profile",
"client_id": os.getenv("MUSE_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID", "").strip(),
"client_secret": os.getenv("MUSE_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET", "").strip(),
"id_env": "MUSE_GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID",
"secret_env": "MUSE_GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET",
},
}
GH_API = "https://api.github.com/user"
GOOGLE_API = "https://openidconnect.googleapis.com/v1/userinfo"
# Paths reachable without a session. Deliberately tiny: /healthz reports a bare
# ok so the container healthcheck works without leaking configuration, and the
# static assets must load on the login page itself.
# ok so the container healthcheck works without leaking configuration.
PUBLIC_PATHS = {"/healthz", "/auth/login", "/auth/callback", "/auth/logout"}
ROLES = ("admin", "user", "guest")
def auth_preflight():
if AUTH_MODE == "off":
@@ -151,22 +189,50 @@ def auth_preflight():
log.warning("Never expose this to the internet in this state.")
log.warning("=" * 62)
return
if AUTH_MODE != "github":
raise RuntimeError(f"MUSE_AUTH must be 'github' or 'off', got {AUTH_MODE!r}")
missing = [n for n, v in (
("MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_ID", GH_CLIENT_ID),
("MUSE_GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET", GH_CLIENT_SECRET),
("MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS", ALLOWED_USERS),
("MUSE_BASE_URL", BASE_URL)) if not v]
if not ENABLED_PROVIDERS:
raise RuntimeError(f"MUSE_AUTH must list providers or be 'off', got {AUTH_MODE!r}")
unknown = [p for p in ENABLED_PROVIDERS if p not in PROVIDERS]
if unknown:
raise RuntimeError(
f"MUSE_AUTH names unknown provider(s) {unknown}. "
f"Valid: {', '.join(PROVIDERS)}, or 'off'.")
missing: list[str] = []
for p in ENABLED_PROVIDERS:
cfg = PROVIDERS[p]
if not cfg["client_id"]:
missing.append(cfg["id_env"])
if not cfg["client_secret"]:
missing.append(cfg["secret_env"])
if not BASE_URL:
missing.append("MUSE_BASE_URL")
# The bootstrap allowlist is only mandatory while nobody exists yet —
# otherwise a working multi-user install would be held hostage by an env
# var it has outgrown. But an EMPTY database and no allowlist means nobody
# can ever log in, which is a misconfiguration worth refusing to start on.
if not ALLOWED_USERS and not _any_users():
missing.append("MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS")
if missing:
raise RuntimeError(
"GitHub auth is enabled but " + ", ".join(missing) + " not set. "
"Auth is enabled but " + ", ".join(sorted(set(missing))) + " not set. "
"Refusing to start: set them, or set MUSE_AUTH=off to run without "
"authentication (LAN only).")
if not BASE_URL.startswith("https://") and COOKIE_SECURE:
log.warning("MUSE_BASE_URL is not https but cookies are Secure — the "
"browser will refuse to send them. Set MUSE_COOKIE_SECURE=false "
"only if you are testing over plain http on a LAN.")
log.info("auth: providers=%s bootstrap_allowlist=%d",
",".join(ENABLED_PROVIDERS), len(ALLOWED_USERS))
def _any_users() -> bool:
try:
with db() as c:
return c.execute("SELECT 1 FROM users LIMIT 1").fetchone() is not None
except sqlite3.Error:
return False
def _hash(tok: str) -> str:
@@ -185,7 +251,21 @@ def new_session(username: str) -> str:
return token
def session_user(request: Request) -> str | None:
def may_login(username: str, row: sqlite3.Row | None) -> bool:
"""The single authorization rule, used at login AND on every request.
Bootstrap allowlist first, then a live, non-disabled user row. Deliberately
one function: an authorization check that runs only at login is not a
revocation mechanism, it is a delay — disabling someone would leave their
session valid for up to MUSE_SESSION_DAYS.
"""
if username.lower() in ALLOWED_USERS:
return True
return bool(row) and not row["disabled"]
def current_user(request: Request) -> sqlite3.Row | None:
"""The signed-in user's row, or None. Re-validated on every request."""
tok = request.cookies.get(SESSION_COOKIE)
if not tok:
return None
@@ -193,24 +273,52 @@ def session_user(request: Request) -> str | None:
row = c.execute(
"SELECT username, expires_at FROM sessions WHERE token_hash=?",
(_hash(tok),)).fetchone()
if not row:
return None
try:
if datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"]) < datetime.now(timezone.utc):
if not row:
return None
except ValueError:
return None
# Re-check the allowlist on every request, so removing someone from
# MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS locks them out immediately instead of whenever their
# session happens to expire. Same for the per-user disable flag: a
# revocation that only took effect on expiry would be a revocation in name
# only.
if row["username"].lower() not in ALLOWED_USERS:
return None
with db() as c:
u = c.execute("SELECT disabled FROM users WHERE username=?",
try:
if datetime.fromisoformat(row["expires_at"]) < datetime.now(timezone.utc):
return None
except ValueError:
return None
u = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?",
(row["username"],)).fetchone()
return None if u and u["disabled"] else row["username"]
if not may_login(row["username"], u):
return None
if u is None:
# Allowlisted but no row — an admin deleted the bootstrap account while
# its session was still live. The allowlist is exactly the recovery
# path for that, so put the row back rather than half-authenticating
# them into a state where every role check fails.
u = upsert_user(row["username"])
log.info("auth: restored deleted allowlisted user %s", row["username"])
return u
def session_user(request: Request) -> str | None:
u = current_user(request)
return u["username"] if u else None
def user_role(request: Request) -> str:
u = current_user(request)
if u:
return u["role"]
# With auth off there is nobody to be, so everyone is an admin — otherwise
# the admin panel would be unreachable on a LAN-only install.
return "admin" if AUTH_MODE == "off" else "guest"
def require_admin(request: Request) -> str:
if AUTH_MODE == "off":
return "local"
u = current_user(request)
if not u:
raise HTTPException(401, "unauthenticated")
if u["role"] != "admin":
log.warning("admin: DENIED %s (role=%s) -> %s",
u["username"], u["role"], request.url.path)
raise HTTPException(403, "admin only")
return u["username"]
SAFE = re.compile(r'[<>:"/\\|?*\x00-\x1f]')
@@ -284,22 +392,35 @@ def init_db():
("duration", "INTEGER")):
if col not in cols:
c.execute(f"ALTER TABLE jobs ADD COLUMN {col} {decl}")
ucols = {r["name"] for r in c.execute("PRAGMA table_info(users)").fetchall()}
for col, decl in (("storage_quota", "INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0"),
("invited_by", "TEXT")):
if col not in ucols:
c.execute(f"ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN {col} {decl}")
c.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS jobs_by_user ON jobs (requested_by)")
c.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS jobs_by_state ON jobs (state)")
c.execute("CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS jobs_by_created ON jobs (created_at)")
def upsert_user(username: str, avatar: str = "", display: str = "") -> sqlite3.Row:
"""Record the sign-in. The first user to ever log in becomes admin --
there is no bootstrap ceremony and no default password to forget."""
def upsert_user(username: str, avatar: str = "", display: str = "",
provider: str = "github") -> sqlite3.Row:
"""Record the sign-in.
The first user to ever log in becomes admin — no bootstrap ceremony, no
default password to forget. Everyone after that is a plain user until an
admin says otherwise; role is never touched on subsequent logins, or every
sign-in would silently undo a demotion.
"""
with db() as c:
first = c.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM users").fetchone()["n"] == 0
c.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (username,provider,role,display,avatar,last_seen) "
"VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,datetime('now')) "
"ON CONFLICT(username) DO UPDATE SET "
" last_seen=datetime('now'), avatar=excluded.avatar, "
" last_seen=datetime('now'), provider=excluded.provider, "
" avatar=COALESCE(NULLIF(excluded.avatar,''), users.avatar), "
" display=COALESCE(NULLIF(excluded.display,''), users.display)",
(username, "github", "admin" if first else "user", display, avatar))
(username, provider, "admin" if first else "user", display, avatar))
return c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?", (username,)).fetchone()
@@ -542,7 +663,14 @@ async def import_worker():
if not src:
continue # still being moved out of incomplete
dest = tag_and_file(job, src)
set_state(job["id"], "imported", str(dest), imported_path=str(dest))
# Record the real size, not the size the peer advertised —
# storage quotas are computed from this column.
try:
actual = src.stat().st_size
except OSError:
actual = job["size"]
set_state(job["id"], "imported", str(dest),
imported_path=str(dest), size=actual)
elif "Completed" in st and "Succeeded" not in st:
set_state(job["id"], "failed", f"transfer {st}")
except Exception as e:
@@ -553,8 +681,10 @@ async def import_worker():
@asynccontextmanager
async def lifespan(_: FastAPI):
auth_preflight() # raises and stops the container if misconfigured
# init_db first: the preflight consults the users table to decide whether
# the bootstrap allowlist is still mandatory.
init_db()
auth_preflight() # raises and stops the container if misconfigured
# The queue lives in memory, so a restart mid-import would otherwise
# strand every unstarted job in 'queued' forever with nothing to pick it
@@ -682,64 +812,134 @@ async def healthz():
return {"ok": True}
CHOOSER = """<!doctype html><html lang=en><head><meta charset=utf-8>
<meta name=viewport content="width=device-width,initial-scale=1"><title>muse</title>
</head><body style="margin:0;min-height:100vh;display:grid;place-items:center;
background:#08090d;color:#f2f4f9;font:15px/1.5 -apple-system,BlinkMacSystemFont,
ui-sans-serif,system-ui,sans-serif">
<div style="text-align:center;padding:32px">
<div style="font-size:26px;font-weight:700;letter-spacing:-.5px">muse</div>
<div style="color:#9aa3b6;font-size:13px;margin:6px 0 26px">Sign in to continue</div>
{buttons}</div></body></html>"""
_BTN = ('<a href="/auth/login?provider={p}" style="display:block;margin:10px auto;'
'padding:12px 26px;min-width:230px;border-radius:12px;text-decoration:none;'
'background:rgb(255 255 255/.06);border:1px solid rgb(255 255 255/.14);'
'color:#f2f4f9;font-weight:600">Continue with {label}</a>')
@app.get("/auth/login")
async def auth_login():
async def auth_login(provider: str = ""):
"""Start OAuth. With several providers enabled and none named, offer a
choice — a tiny self-contained page that uses only style attributes, which
the CSP already permits, so it needs no stylesheet and no extra hash."""
if AUTH_MODE == "off":
return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=302)
state = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
url = (f"{GH_AUTH}?client_id={GH_CLIENT_ID}"
f"&redirect_uri={BASE_URL}/auth/callback"
f"&scope=read:user&state={state}&allow_signup=false")
resp = RedirectResponse(url, status_code=302)
# CSRF defence: the state we generated is echoed back by GitHub and must
# match this cookie, so a callback the user did not initiate is rejected.
_set_cookie(resp, STATE_COOKIE, state, 600)
if not provider:
if len(ENABLED_PROVIDERS) == 1:
provider = ENABLED_PROVIDERS[0]
else:
buttons = "".join(
_BTN.format(p=p, label=PROVIDERS[p]["label"]) for p in ENABLED_PROVIDERS)
return HTMLResponse(CHOOSER.replace("{buttons}", buttons))
if provider not in ENABLED_PROVIDERS:
raise HTTPException(404, "unknown provider")
cfg = PROVIDERS[provider]
nonce = secrets.token_urlsafe(24)
params = {
"client_id": cfg["client_id"],
"redirect_uri": f"{BASE_URL}/auth/callback",
"scope": cfg["scope"],
"state": nonce,
"response_type": "code",
}
if provider == "github":
params["allow_signup"] = "false"
if provider == "google":
# Force the account chooser; otherwise Google silently reuses whichever
# account the browser last used, which on a shared machine signs you in
# as someone else with no visible prompt.
params["prompt"] = "select_account"
resp = RedirectResponse(f"{cfg['authorize']}?{urlencode(params)}", status_code=302)
# CSRF defence: the nonce is echoed back by the provider and must match
# this cookie, so a callback the user did not initiate is rejected. The
# provider name rides along in the COOKIE, never the query string, so the
# callback cannot be steered to a different provider by the redirect.
_set_cookie(resp, STATE_COOKIE, f"{provider}|{nonce}", 600)
return resp
async def fetch_identity(provider: str, token: str) -> tuple[str, str, str]:
"""(username, display, avatar) for a provider access token."""
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=20) as c:
if provider == "github":
r = await c.get(GH_API, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"})
if r.status_code != 200:
raise HTTPException(401, "github user lookup failed")
p = r.json() or {}
return p.get("login") or "", p.get("name") or "", p.get("avatar_url") or ""
r = await c.get(GOOGLE_API, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"})
if r.status_code != 200:
raise HTTPException(401, "google user lookup failed")
p = r.json() or {}
# Unverified Google emails must never become an identity: anyone can
# put someone else's address on an account they control, and the
# allowlist is keyed on exactly this string.
if not p.get("email") or not p.get("email_verified"):
raise HTTPException(403, "google account has no verified email")
return p["email"], p.get("name") or "", p.get("picture") or ""
@app.get("/auth/callback")
async def auth_callback(request: Request, code: str = "", state: str = ""):
if AUTH_MODE == "off":
return RedirectResponse("/", status_code=302)
expected = request.cookies.get(STATE_COOKIE) or ""
if not code or not state or not secrets.compare_digest(state, expected):
cookie = request.cookies.get(STATE_COOKIE) or ""
provider, _, nonce = cookie.partition("|")
if (not code or not state or not nonce
or provider not in ENABLED_PROVIDERS
or not secrets.compare_digest(state, nonce)):
log.warning("auth: rejected callback with bad or missing state")
return JSONResponse({"error": "invalid state"}, status_code=400)
cfg = PROVIDERS[provider]
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=20) as c:
t = await c.post(GH_TOKEN, headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
data={"client_id": GH_CLIENT_ID,
"client_secret": GH_CLIENT_SECRET,
t = await c.post(cfg["token"], headers={"Accept": "application/json"},
data={"client_id": cfg["client_id"],
"client_secret": cfg["client_secret"],
"code": code,
"grant_type": "authorization_code",
"redirect_uri": f"{BASE_URL}/auth/callback"})
token = (t.json() or {}).get("access_token") if t.status_code == 200 else None
if not token:
log.warning("auth: token exchange failed (%s)", t.status_code)
return JSONResponse({"error": "token exchange failed"}, status_code=401)
if not token:
log.warning("auth: %s token exchange failed (%s)", provider, t.status_code)
return JSONResponse({"error": "token exchange failed"}, status_code=401)
u = await c.get(GH_API, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
"Accept": "application/vnd.github+json"})
if u.status_code != 200:
return JSONResponse({"error": "github user lookup failed"}, status_code=401)
profile = u.json() or {}
login = profile.get("login") or ""
username, display, avatar = await fetch_identity(provider, token)
if not username:
return JSONResponse({"error": "no username from provider"}, status_code=401)
if login.lower() not in ALLOWED_USERS:
with db() as c:
existing = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?",
(username,)).fetchone()
if not may_login(username, existing):
# Log the attempt: on an internet-facing box this is the signal that
# someone found the login page.
log.warning("auth: DENIED github user %r (not in MUSE_ALLOWED_USERS)", login)
why = "disabled" if existing else "not invited"
log.warning("auth: DENIED %s user %r (%s)", provider, username, why)
return JSONResponse({"error": "not authorised"}, status_code=403)
row = upsert_user(login, profile.get("avatar_url") or "",
profile.get("name") or "")
if row and row["disabled"]:
log.warning("auth: DENIED %r (account disabled)", login)
return JSONResponse({"error": "account disabled"}, status_code=403)
log.info("auth: signed in %s (%s)", login, row["role"] if row else "user")
row = upsert_user(username, avatar, display, provider)
log.info("auth: signed in %s via %s (%s)", username, provider, row["role"])
resp = RedirectResponse("/", status_code=302)
_set_cookie(resp, SESSION_COOKIE, new_session(login), SESSION_DAYS * 86400)
_set_cookie(resp, SESSION_COOKIE, new_session(username), SESSION_DAYS * 86400)
resp.delete_cookie(STATE_COOKIE, path="/")
return resp
@@ -755,15 +955,68 @@ async def auth_logout(request: Request):
return resp
# ─────────────────────────── quotas ───────────────────────────
#
# Two limits, both per user, both 0 = unlimited:
# quota requests per CALENDAR month (resets on the 1st)
# storage_quota bytes of imported audio attributable to this user
#
# Calendar month rather than a rolling 30-day window on purpose: "you have 12
# left until the 1st" is something a person can reason about, where a rolling
# window silently drips capacity back at times nobody can predict.
def month_start() -> str:
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-01 00:00:00")
def usage_for(username: str | None) -> dict:
"""Requests this month and bytes imported, for one user."""
if not username:
return {"requests": 0, "storage": 0}
with db() as c:
n = c.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM jobs WHERE requested_by=? AND created_at >= ?",
(username, month_start())).fetchone()["n"]
b = c.execute(
"SELECT COALESCE(SUM(size),0) b FROM jobs "
"WHERE requested_by=? AND state='imported'", (username,)).fetchone()["b"]
return {"requests": n, "storage": b}
def check_quota(request: Request, adding: int = 1):
"""Raise 429 if this request would exceed the caller's monthly allowance.
Admins are exempt — someone has to be able to fix the library when a quota
is what is in the way.
"""
u = current_user(request)
if not u or u["role"] == "admin":
return
used = usage_for(u["username"])
if u["quota"] and used["requests"] + adding > u["quota"]:
raise HTTPException(429, (
f"Monthly request quota reached ({used['requests']}/{u['quota']}). "
f"Resets on the 1st."))
if u["storage_quota"] and used["storage"] >= u["storage_quota"]:
raise HTTPException(429, (
f"Storage quota reached ({used['storage'] // 2**30} GB of "
f"{u['storage_quota'] // 2**30} GB)."))
@app.get("/api/me")
async def me(request: Request):
who = session_user(request)
if not who:
return {"user": None, "auth": AUTH_MODE}
with db() as c:
u = c.execute("SELECT username,role,display,avatar,quota FROM users "
"WHERE username=?", (who,)).fetchone()
return {"user": who, "auth": AUTH_MODE, **(dict(u) if u else {"role": "user"})}
u = current_user(request)
if not u:
return {"user": None, "auth": AUTH_MODE,
"role": "admin" if AUTH_MODE == "off" else None,
"providers": ENABLED_PROVIDERS}
return {
"user": u["username"], "auth": AUTH_MODE, "role": u["role"],
"display": u["display"], "avatar": u["avatar"], "provider": u["provider"],
"quota": u["quota"], "storage_quota": u["storage_quota"],
"usage": usage_for(u["username"]),
"providers": ENABLED_PROVIDERS,
}
class RequestBody(BaseModel):
@@ -1080,6 +1333,7 @@ async def enrich(deezer_id) -> dict:
@app.post("/api/request")
async def request_track(body: RequestBody, request: Request):
check_quota(request)
e = await enrich(body.deezer_id)
return {"id": await enqueue_job(
e.get("artist") or body.artist, body.title,
@@ -1102,6 +1356,10 @@ async def request_batch(body: BatchBody, request: Request):
album, year and track position for every one of them. Re-fetching would be
nb_tracks extra calls to learn what we were just told.
"""
# Checked against the whole batch, not one track: queueing a 30-track album
# when 5 requests remain should be refused up front, not accepted and then
# blocked halfway through.
check_quota(request, adding=len(body.tracks))
who = session_user(request)
ids = [await enqueue_job(t.artist, t.title, t.album, t.year, t.track,
t.deezer_id, requested_by=who, cover=t.cover,
@@ -1155,6 +1413,10 @@ async def import_list(body: ImportBody, request: Request):
m = DEEZER_URL.search(line)
lines.extend(await expand_url(*m.groups()) if m else [line])
# After expansion — a single playlist URL can be 200 tracks, and the point
# of the check is the real number, not the number of lines pasted.
check_quota(request, adding=len(lines))
for line in lines:
# Search the line as typed; the ranker already weights an artist-name
# match heavily, so "Artist - Title" needs no special handling.
@@ -1185,31 +1447,331 @@ async def import_list(body: ImportBody, request: Request):
@app.get("/api/jobs")
async def jobs(limit: int = 200):
async def jobs(request: Request, limit: int = 200, mine: bool = False):
"""Own requests by default; admins see everyone's.
Scoped rather than global because on a shared instance one person's
request history is a list of what they listen to, which is nobody else's
business by default.
"""
u = current_user(request)
everyone = (AUTH_MODE == "off") or (u is not None and u["role"] == "admin" and not mine)
who = None if everyone else (u["username"] if u else None)
where, args = ("", []) if everyone else ("WHERE requested_by IS ?", [who])
with db() as c:
rows = c.execute(
"SELECT * FROM jobs ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC LIMIT ?",
(limit,)).fetchall()
f"SELECT * FROM jobs {where} ORDER BY created_at DESC, rowid DESC LIMIT ?",
[*args, limit]).fetchall()
counts = {r["state"]: r["n"] for r in c.execute(
"SELECT state, COUNT(*) n FROM jobs GROUP BY state").fetchall()}
f"SELECT state, COUNT(*) n FROM jobs {where} GROUP BY state",
args).fetchall()}
return {"jobs": [dict(r) for r in rows], "counts": counts,
"pending": work_q.qsize()}
"pending": work_q.qsize(), "scope": "all" if everyone else "mine"}
@app.post("/api/retry/{job_id}")
async def retry(job_id: str):
async def retry(job_id: str, request: Request):
"""Put a failed job back on the queue. Soulseek failures are usually the
peer going offline, not the request being wrong, so retrying later often
just works."""
u = current_user(request)
with db() as c:
row = c.execute("SELECT id FROM jobs WHERE id=?", (job_id,)).fetchone()
row = c.execute("SELECT id, requested_by FROM jobs WHERE id=?",
(job_id,)).fetchone()
if not row:
raise HTTPException(404, "no such job")
# Same 404 rather than 403 for someone else's job: a distinct error would
# confirm the id exists, which is a small oracle over other people's
# requests.
if AUTH_MODE != "off" and u and u["role"] != "admin" \
and row["requested_by"] != u["username"]:
raise HTTPException(404, "no such job")
set_state(job_id, "queued", "")
await work_q.put(job_id)
return {"ok": True}
# ─────────────────────────── admin ───────────────────────────
class NewUser(BaseModel):
username: str
provider: str = "github"
role: str = "user"
quota: int = 0
storage_quota_gb: float = 0
class PatchUser(BaseModel):
role: str | None = None
quota: int | None = None
storage_quota_gb: float | None = None
disabled: bool | None = None
def user_dict(r: sqlite3.Row) -> dict:
u = usage_for(r["username"])
return {
"username": r["username"], "provider": r["provider"], "role": r["role"],
"display": r["display"], "avatar": r["avatar"],
"quota": r["quota"], "storage_quota": r["storage_quota"],
"disabled": bool(r["disabled"]), "created_at": r["created_at"],
"last_seen": r["last_seen"], "invited_by": r["invited_by"],
"usage": u,
# Surfaced so the UI doesn't have to know the allowlist rule: these are
# the accounts that cannot actually be locked out by disabling them.
"bootstrap": r["username"].lower() in ALLOWED_USERS,
}
@app.get("/api/admin/users")
async def admin_users(request: Request):
require_admin(request)
with db() as c:
rows = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY role='admin' DESC, username").fetchall()
return {"users": [user_dict(r) for r in rows], "roles": list(ROLES)}
@app.post("/api/admin/users")
async def admin_add_user(body: NewUser, request: Request):
"""Invite someone. There is no email or token — the row IS the invitation:
once it exists, that identity can sign in with the matching provider."""
who = require_admin(request)
name = body.username.strip()
if not name:
raise HTTPException(400, "username required")
if body.role not in ROLES:
raise HTTPException(400, f"role must be one of {', '.join(ROLES)}")
if body.provider not in PROVIDERS:
raise HTTPException(400, f"provider must be one of {', '.join(PROVIDERS)}")
with db() as c:
if c.execute("SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE username=?", (name,)).fetchone():
raise HTTPException(409, "that user already exists")
c.execute(
"INSERT INTO users (username,provider,role,quota,storage_quota,invited_by) "
"VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?)",
(name, body.provider, body.role, max(0, body.quota),
int(max(0.0, body.storage_quota_gb) * 2**30), who))
r = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?", (name,)).fetchone()
log.info("admin: %s invited %s as %s", who, name, body.role)
return user_dict(r)
@app.patch("/api/admin/users/{username}")
async def admin_patch_user(username: str, body: PatchUser, request: Request):
who = require_admin(request)
with db() as c:
r = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?", (username,)).fetchone()
if not r:
raise HTTPException(404, "no such user")
# An install with no admin cannot be administered, and nothing in the
# UI can undo it. Refuse to remove the last one — whether by demotion
# or by disabling them.
losing_admin = r["role"] == "admin" and (
(body.role is not None and body.role != "admin") or body.disabled is True)
if losing_admin:
others = c.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM users "
"WHERE role='admin' AND disabled=0 AND username<>?",
(username,)).fetchone()["n"]
if others == 0:
raise HTTPException(
409, "this is the only active admin — promote someone else first")
sets, vals = [], []
if body.role is not None:
if body.role not in ROLES:
raise HTTPException(400, f"role must be one of {', '.join(ROLES)}")
sets.append("role=?"); vals.append(body.role)
if body.quota is not None:
sets.append("quota=?"); vals.append(max(0, body.quota))
if body.storage_quota_gb is not None:
sets.append("storage_quota=?")
vals.append(int(max(0.0, body.storage_quota_gb) * 2**30))
if body.disabled is not None:
sets.append("disabled=?"); vals.append(1 if body.disabled else 0)
if not sets:
raise HTTPException(400, "nothing to change")
c.execute(f"UPDATE users SET {', '.join(sets)} WHERE username=?",
[*vals, username])
# Disabling must take effect now. session_user re-checks on every
# request anyway, but dropping the rows makes it unambiguous.
if body.disabled:
c.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE username=?", (username,))
r = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?", (username,)).fetchone()
log.info("admin: %s updated %s (%s)", who, username, ", ".join(sets))
return user_dict(r)
@app.delete("/api/admin/users/{username}")
async def admin_delete_user(username: str, request: Request):
who = require_admin(request)
with db() as c:
r = c.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE username=?", (username,)).fetchone()
if not r:
raise HTTPException(404, "no such user")
if r["role"] == "admin":
others = c.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM users "
"WHERE role='admin' AND disabled=0 AND username<>?",
(username,)).fetchone()["n"]
if others == 0:
raise HTTPException(409, "this is the only active admin")
c.execute("DELETE FROM sessions WHERE username=?", (username,))
c.execute("DELETE FROM users WHERE username=?", (username,))
# Their jobs are deliberately kept: the history is a record of what is in
# the library and why, and deleting a person should not rewrite it.
log.info("admin: %s deleted user %s (jobs retained)", who, username)
return {"ok": True, "jobs_retained": True}
@app.get("/api/admin/activity")
async def admin_activity(request: Request, days: int = 30):
require_admin(request)
days = max(1, min(days, 365))
since = (datetime.now(timezone.utc) - timedelta(days=days)).strftime("%Y-%m-%d")
with db() as c:
daily = c.execute(
"SELECT substr(created_at,1,10) d, COUNT(*) n, "
" SUM(state='imported') imported, SUM(state='failed') failed "
"FROM jobs WHERE created_at >= ? GROUP BY d ORDER BY d", (since,)).fetchall()
per_user = c.execute(
"SELECT COALESCE(requested_by,'(unattributed)') u, COUNT(*) n, "
" COALESCE(SUM(CASE WHEN state='imported' THEN size END),0) bytes "
"FROM jobs WHERE created_at >= ? GROUP BY u ORDER BY n DESC",
(since,)).fetchall()
top = c.execute(
"SELECT artist, COUNT(*) n FROM jobs WHERE created_at >= ? "
"GROUP BY artist ORDER BY n DESC LIMIT 8", (since,)).fetchall()
# Zero-fill: a bar chart with gaps for quiet days misreads as missing data
# rather than as nothing having happened.
by_day = {r["d"]: r for r in daily}
today = datetime.now(timezone.utc).date()
series = []
for i in range(days - 1, -1, -1):
d = (today - timedelta(days=i)).isoformat()
r = by_day.get(d)
series.append({"date": d, "n": r["n"] if r else 0,
"imported": (r["imported"] or 0) if r else 0,
"failed": (r["failed"] or 0) if r else 0})
return {"days": days, "series": series,
"per_user": [dict(r) for r in per_user],
"top_artists": [dict(r) for r in top]}
def _proc_stat() -> tuple[int, int]:
"""(busy, total) jiffies from /proc/stat."""
with open("/proc/stat") as f:
parts = [int(x) for x in f.readline().split()[1:]]
idle = parts[3] + (parts[4] if len(parts) > 4 else 0)
return sum(parts) - idle, sum(parts)
_cpu_prev: tuple[int, int] | None = None
def system_stats() -> dict:
"""Host CPU/RAM plus disk for the paths that matter.
Reads /proc directly rather than adding psutil: it is ~30 lines, keeps the
image free of a compiled dependency, and /proc in a container reports the
HOST's CPU and memory — which is what you actually want to see for a
homelab box. Everything is individually guarded so a non-Linux dev machine
degrades to nulls instead of 500ing the whole panel.
"""
global _cpu_prev
out: dict = {}
try:
busy, total = _proc_stat()
if _cpu_prev:
db_, dt = busy - _cpu_prev[0], total - _cpu_prev[1]
out["cpu_pct"] = round(100 * db_ / dt, 1) if dt > 0 else None
else:
out["cpu_pct"] = None # first call has no baseline to diff
_cpu_prev = (busy, total)
except Exception:
out["cpu_pct"] = None
try:
mem = {}
with open("/proc/meminfo") as f:
for line in f:
k, _, v = line.partition(":")
mem[k] = int(v.split()[0]) * 1024
total_b = mem.get("MemTotal", 0)
avail = mem.get("MemAvailable", 0)
out["mem_total"] = total_b
out["mem_used"] = total_b - avail
out["mem_pct"] = round(100 * (total_b - avail) / total_b, 1) if total_b else None
except Exception:
out["mem_total"] = out["mem_used"] = out["mem_pct"] = None
try:
out["load"] = [round(x, 2) for x in os.getloadavg()]
out["cpus"] = os.cpu_count()
except Exception:
out["load"] = None
disks = {}
for label, p in (("library", LIBRARY_DIR), ("downloads", DOWNLOAD_DIR)):
try:
s = os.statvfs(p)
total_b = s.f_blocks * s.f_frsize
free = s.f_bavail * s.f_frsize
disks[label] = {"total": total_b, "used": total_b - free, "free": free,
"pct": round(100 * (total_b - free) / total_b, 1) if total_b else None}
except Exception:
disks[label] = None
out["disks"] = disks
return out
@app.get("/api/admin/system")
async def admin_system(request: Request):
require_admin(request)
out = {"system": system_stats(), "workers": WORKERS, "pending": work_q.qsize()}
with db() as c:
out["jobs"] = {r["state"]: r["n"] for r in c.execute(
"SELECT state, COUNT(*) n FROM jobs GROUP BY state").fetchall()}
out["library"] = {
"tracks": c.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM jobs WHERE state='imported'").fetchone()["n"],
"bytes": c.execute(
"SELECT COALESCE(SUM(size),0) b FROM jobs "
"WHERE state='imported'").fetchone()["b"],
}
out["users"] = c.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM users").fetchone()["n"]
out["sessions"] = c.execute(
"SELECT COUNT(*) n FROM sessions WHERE expires_at > ?",
(datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),)).fetchone()["n"]
slskd: dict = {"ok": False}
try:
async with slskd_client() as sc:
r = await sc.get("/api/v0/application")
slskd["ok"] = r.status_code == 200
if r.status_code == 200:
d = r.json()
srv = d.get("server") or {}
slskd["connected"] = bool(srv.get("isConnected"))
slskd["logged_in"] = bool(srv.get("isLoggedIn"))
slskd["version"] = d.get("version")
shares = d.get("shares") or {}
slskd["shared_files"] = (shares.get("directories") or {}).get("fileCount") \
or shares.get("fileCount")
else:
slskd["error"] = f"HTTP {r.status_code}"
except Exception as e:
slskd["error"] = str(e)[:120]
out["slskd"] = slskd
return out
@app.get("/api/health")
async def health():
ok, detail = True, {}